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ABSTRACT
An industrial policy is "any government measure that prevents
or promotes changes in the structure of an economy."

This paper

provides an overview of the issue, by focusing on how government
can encourage productivity growth in the economy.
By studying other countries we hope to learn how industrial
policy might work in America.

The obvious choice to model is

Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), but
other countries, most notably the British and the French, have
adopted certain pOlicies as well.

On the whole, while Japan has

been most successful, MITI may have more credit than is due, and
countries such as France have failed in their industrial policy
initiatives.
the

Given America's reluctance to involve government in

management of the

economy and the uncertain

response

of

government commissions to crises in the past, the best approach
would be to combine a Japanese MITI-like body with some power and
an

advisory

British-style

committee

that

must

be

checked

by

Congress and/or the president.
Industrial policy should focus on several sectors of the
economy.

There are two ways that industrial policy is helpful.

First, industrial policy can directly influence tariffs and non
tariff barriers (NTBs), which can have a significant influence on
productivi ty.

This paper,

aspect of industrial policy.
can be improved.

however,

only addresses the second

What are the areas where productivity

They include infrastructure, education, science,

technology, and R&D promotion.
iii

The
theories.

methodology

is

based

on both

economic

and

political

Underlying the economics is indifference curve analysis

which postulates that American economic growth in overseas markets
will

depend

productivity.

on

competitiveness,

which

in

turn

depends

upon

Politically, congresspeople will try to maximize

their probability of getting re-elected.

These two theories are

incorporated into a system that ranks preferences on economic and
political feasibility.

Accordingly, since politicians are making

the decisions, more weight is given to the political component, and
the

two

feasibility

feasibility score.
and the

lower of

rankings

are

added

to

come

up

with

a

This score is set against a null hypothesis,
the

two

scores should

reflect Congressional

preference.
President"Clinton has made several proposals, including one
for an Economic Security council.

These

proposal~

for their political and economic feasibility.

are evaluated

Conclusions will

show that for the most part, Clinton's proposals are economically
and politically feasible, compared to what the government currently
does.
There are problems, however, with the data, the methodology,
and the various proposals.
inferred from this study.

There

are

limits

to what can be

These will be explored, and the need

for more research will be examined, as well as what area would be
focused on in the future.

Now, however, this paper provides a

general overview into a topic that is very current.

iv

"Industrial policy"

in the united states has long been a

phrase associated with private firms in the manufacturing sector
meaning the strategy that they use as a whole in order to maximize
their profits. Since the early 1960's however, "industrial policy"
means "any government measure that prevents or promotes changes in
the structure of an economy. 111. Industrial policy is designed to
promote

one

country's

international markets.

manufactured

products

in

national

and

More and more companies want government to

intervene and help them compete, because foreign firms, especially
the Japanese, have the same advantage.

Typically, this "policy"

comes in the form of semi-protectionist tariff and non-tariff
barriers,

government

subsidies

for

industry-wide

R&D,

and

investment spending.
This

policy

has

proven

Economic Miracle" illustrates.

very

effective,

as

the

"Japanese

Not surprisingly, others, such as

members of the European Economic Community (EEC), have followed
their example.

They have also done well, especially in the global

market.

increases

This

the

pressure

for

other

countries

to

initiate their own comprehensive industrial policy, which snowballs
the

effect.

In

fact,

it

has

become

almost

essential

for

governments to help increase their firms' global competitiveness
as markets become increasingly global.
Most of the gains realized by the rest of the world have come
at the expense of the United states.

This fact has

led some

scholars, politicians, and business leaders to call for the u.s.
government to adopt its own industrial policy in order to compete
1

better in the global market.

These people agree with Socialist

author Arthur MacEwan as he says:
Political control over the economy is certainly a
necessary condition for meeting our economic goals, as
much as
staying alive is a necessary condition for
leading a good life.
Just as certainly, of course,
political control,
like staying alive,
is not a
sufficient condition.
It just makes good things
possible.:l
As of 1983, 55 percent of business executives in a survey responded
that

they

dealing

favored

with

states."l

the

,,\ some

kind

problems

of

of

government'

basic

intervention

industries

in

the

in

United

Throughout the '80's and into the '90's, these calls

have intensified.

On a nationally syndicated TV show on 2 April

1992, for example, Democratic nominee hopeful Bill Clinton flatly
stated that "we need an economic policy."4
On

3 November

campaigning

on

the

1992 ,

Cl inton

promise

of

swept

economic

into the White House I
reform.

Several

new

programs and reforms have been suggested by the new president, his
supporters, and his critics.

These proposals all have the same

basic goal: they want to change the way American firms do business
and

make

economy.

them

more

competitive

and

productive

in

the

global

To do this, Clinton and others envision a new industrial

policy for the United states, run by the federal government.
this has proven successful in Japan and Germany,

While

in the United

States it is a controversial concept.
Any industrial policy that the United states would attempt to
undertake must in theory and practice be both economically and
politically feasible, or it has no chance of succeeding.
2

Often,

however, what is economically viable is not politically feasible,
and vice versa.

Industrial policy, if done correctly, can overcome

the gap between economic and political feasibility. It could also
intensify the wedge between them if Congress and/or the Clinton
administration adopt a policy that hurts the American economy, or
if Congress simply refuses to pass an economically sound but
politically damaging policy package.

It is therefore imperative

that a policy must meet both criteria of economic and political
feasibility.

The Arguments For Industrial Policy
Proponents of government-sponsored industrial policy often
argue one of two ways.

First, they will argue that American

competitiveness is decl ining ,

which is weakening our economic

position in the global community and stagnating economic growth.
Therefore, there needs to be some external force to promote market
solutions to help America's economy grow again.

A second common

argument focuses more on international fair play.

A government

agency or agencies that can promote the same type incentives for
domestic firms that other countries' agencies' can will allow

u.s.

firms to be more competitive inherently, because they would then
be dealing on a level playing field.

Both arguments provide ample

support for why there should be an industrial policy in the United
states.

3

The first argument cites statistical evidence to support its
position.

These statistics show that American competitiveness, as

proxied by American productivity, has fallen relatively to the rest
of the world.

Chart 1 shows output per Hour growth rates for

several developed countries.
grown the

least.

America's output per hour rateshave

These rates,

which are used to approximate

productivity, are growing slower than the rest of the world.
Statistics

such

as

these

compel

many

executives

and

policymakers to call for a comprehensive set of government policies
that can address these issues of falling productivity and
competitiveness, falling share of world GNP, and so on.

The trade

deficit is also cited as evidence that our economy is losing
competitiveness; America is importing more and exporting less, and
this

reflects'

on

worsening

competitiveness

in

international

markets.
The impetus for industrial policy from this first argument
comes from the fact that the factors that affect competitiveness,
such as productivity, are not being adequately dealt with in the
market.

If

the

problems

through the market, then
can deal with them.

in

productivity

cannot be

addressed

there must be some other solutions that

This is where the government can step in and

augment the open market by increasing incentives to enhance the
growth

of

productivity

and/or

competitiveness.

Changes

productivity can cause similar changes in competitiveness.

in

If the

factors that affect productivity are not being corrected, then the
factors that deal with competitiveness are not being corrected.
4

CHART 1
Percent Change in Output/Hr, 1960-1990

United Kingdom
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Norway
Netherlands
Italy
Germany
France
Denmark
Belgium
Japan
Canada
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123
456
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Source: Monthly Labor Rev. Dec. 1991.

The second argument attacks the lack of industrial policy from
an advantage standpoint.

Basically, the argument is that the rest

of the countries have an industrial policy that provides them with
certain advantages that U.S. firms don't have.

As a result, they

are better able to compete in the marketplace.

In order to "level

the playing field, II our firms need the same type of government
support.

This aspect of industri 1 policy, though, is not within

the scope of this paper; the focus will be on industrial policy
that deals with increasing productivity.

In order to analyze any industrial policy, it is helpful at
first to understand the history of industrial policy will highlight
what types of policy have been tried in the past both in the United
States and other countries, notably Japan.
of industrial policy are explored.

Second, the contents

Third, the theories of economic

and political viability are developed, followed by the method of
analysis.

Finally, the industrial policy analyzed will be the the

Clinton agenda pertaining to
concerns.

competitiveness

and

productivity

Analysis will show that most of the proposals are valid

both economically and politically, compared to what the government
currently does.

II.

LEARNING FROM OTHER COUNTRIES

Most other countries have attempted a form of industrial
policy, which America can learn a great deal from.

Primarily,

though, they have followed one of two models, either the
6

Japanes~

model or the British model.

The Japanese model focuses on an

administrative agency that can direct the economy and
penetration into domestic markets, a MIT! -type agency.
model

of

industrial

policy,

"information/consensus

on

the other hand,

agency"

Economic Development Council. s
roads to industrial policy.

like

Great

foreign

The Br i tish

centers

Britain's

on an

National

These two models offer different

Both have mixed records, though.

The Japanese Experience
At the end of World War

II,

the Japanese economy was

in

shambles, and subject to the rule of the occupying American forces
stationed there.

American forces

had distinct goals

for

the

Japanese economy:
After WW:II, America tried to keep Japan an agrarian
nation, but this approach was abandoned in 1947 and again
when occupation ended with the signing of the San
Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951. 'The initial policy to
discourage all the seeds of its war potential and keeping
Japan as a land of agriculture and insignificant commerce
proved too costly for the U.S. Treasury.' [Ozaki, 1992,
p. 7] 6
After this policy was abandoned,

the Japanese began to develop

their own economy and institutions immediately.

On 25 May 1949,

they established the Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI) to oversee the international economic policies of Japan, and
on 24 November 1949, the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control
Law (FEFTCL) was passed. 7

These laws, and others, such as the

Export-Import Transactions Law which actually allowed cartels to
be formed under certain conditions B , all intended to strengthen the
7

Japanese economy by semi-protectionist industrial policy means.
u.s. foreign policy permitted this advantageous behavior:
until the 1960's the United states helped the recovery
and development in Japan by keeping the u.s. market open
for Japanese goods, while at the same time accepting
Japanese protectionist policies . . • . The United states
accepted such asymmetrical benefits because of a
cOIontitment to
Japanese recovery, because it
expected to benef it from the reductions when the exchange
controls were removed, and because it sought to maintain
the momentu~ of establishing a more open trading system. 9
America expected to benefit from the post-protectionist era that
would ensue after Japan had firmly re-established its economy.
This American policy, coupled with the protection itself, provided
Japanese

firms

with

favorable

advantages from which to grow.

domestic

and

foreign

market

Japan took advantage of it.

Against this backdrop of both favorable domestic and foreign
government policy, the Japanese Economic Miracle occurred.
~iracle

This

consisted of annual real growth of Gross National Product

(GNP) of 10% for every year from 1950 to 1970.

Among the reasons

explaining this unprecedented phenomenon are Japan's ability to
absorb and adapt foreign technology, the availability of labor due
to movement out of agriculture and a growing population, heavy
investment in manufacturing, and the previously mentioned
government policies of export expansion and import protection .10
Japan went from a minor economic power in 1960, when they had less
than 3% of the world GNP, to a major force in the 1980's, as Japan
accounted for 10% of world GNP and 8.3% of world trade. l l
Industrial policy receives a lot of credit for some of the
successes of the Japanese economy during this period.
8

For example,

the government targeted industries such as steel, oil refining,
petrochemicals,
electronics,

automobiles,

and

aircraft,

computers,

and

industrial

promoted

them

machinery,

"through

tax

incentives as well as financing provided by government lending
institutions
policies. tl 12
Japanese

and

private

savings

encouraged

by

government

Industrial policy in Japan improved productivity of

firms,

competitiveness.

which

thereby

increased

its

international

As Japan's competitiveness increased, they had

an open market waiting in the United states that absorbed their
goods, which increased international trade in the favor of Japan
and at the expense of the united states.
Japan also invested heavily into its private sector.

This

gave firms the capital necessary to expand business, often beyond
the country's' borders.

There was

also

reinvestment

into new

technologies and procedures that would increase productivity.

Base

technologies from foreign countries, especially basic technoloqies
from the united states, would be adapted to Japanese production
techniques and brought to the international market quicker than the
United States could bring it.

These industrial

policies also

increased productivity, and allowed Japan to significantly increase
its competitiveness in the global arena.

This has resulted in

considerable economic growth for the country.
These

effects

were

augmented by

other

pOlicies

that

the

government undertook for the sake of industrial policy that
increased competitiveness, namely the use of tariffs and NTB's by
MITI and other organizations.

Contrary to popular thought, the
9

tariff is not the main protectionist strategy that Japan opts for.
It is relatively minor,

and usually ineffective.

The use of

tariffs also provided political problems for Japan, as the GATT was
making strides in eliminating tariffs in other countries, Japan
still had relatively high tariffs 13 ; as the Japanese economy grew
and grew, this became increasingly more unacceptable to the rest
of the world.
The situation finally reached the beginning of resolution in
1959, when at an International Monetary Fund (IMF) conference in
washington, D.C., the united states "reminded Japan that the pace
of her trade liberalization was unjustifiably slow in light of her
growth records and balance-of-payments position. 1114

As the GATT

conference began in Tokyo later that winter, these discussions
continued.

After that, "these experiences compelled the Japanese

government to realize that as an international bargaining tool, if
nothing else, the early liberalization of her trade became a matter
of necessity. n 15
As a result Japan did start to lower her formal tariffs, and
continued to do so as a condition of admission into the IMF in
1964. 16

They continued to be reduced, and Japan participated in

the GATT Kennedy, and Tokyo rounds, until by 1988, Bela Balassa and
Marcus Noland argue that "on the whole,

tariff rates on non

agricultural products in Japan approximate those of the EEC and the
U.S."n

For the most part, this is still true.

The Japanese markets remain relatively closed to foreign
competition today, however.

The United States and other developed
10

countries believed that if they could force Japan to lower their
tariffs, they could still make significant inroads to the Japanese
markets.

However, this line of reasoning was faulty, because the

main elements of protection the Japanese employed were NTB' s.
Consequently, "when Japanese tariffs were significantly reduced in
the GATT Kennedy Round, there were still significant barriers to
entry in the Japanese market. nlS

These were the NTB's that made up

most of the industrial policy's protectionist strategy to increase
Japanese competitiveness.
NTB's include

n

all transparent border measures that directly

or indirectly limit imports. "19

This can include,

but is not

limited to, such restraints as quotas, Voluntary Export Restraints
(VERs)

and Voluntary Restraint Agreements

(VRAs),

and

tariff

quotas, which increase the duty on goods after a specific amount.
other types of NTB's are more informal, and include "administrative
guidance" requirements, customs procedures, standards, testing,· and
certification requirements, publ'c procurement practices that are
primarily

closed

to

the

foreign

competition,

and

defense

of

depressed industries. 20
Unlike the GATT reduction on tariffs, there have not been many
agreements on what to do about NTB's.

The Tokyo Round of the GATT

(1973-79) came up with the first set of codes on NTB's, but this
has not really limited their use. The Second Maekawa Report, issued
in 1987, recognized the need for Japan to liberalize its practices
in, among other things, importing manufactured goods, tariffs, the
government

procurement

system

to
11

allow

some

imports,

and

agriculture. 41

This

would

allow

for

fairer

competition

in

the

Japanese markets.
Japan is not the only country to employ NTB's as a defensive
tactic in order to give domestic firms a little edge.
the

U.S.

are

restrictions,

equally
however,

culpable.

Japan's

The EEe and

more

extensive

often mean the difference in cost of a

Japanese good, as opposed to a foreign good.

Where the NTB's are

relatively low, as they generally are in the U.S., they usually
cannot promote such an effect.

This has given Japan a relative

advantage over the U.S. in terms of market penetration, which has
led to some of the gains that the Japanese have made.
Japan has developed a very successful industrial policy around
a few central principles.
sector

increase

The government should help the private

productivity,

international competitiveness.
stimulate

which

will

help

increase

The government should also help

investment and R&D spending,

and help private

firms

develop new technologies that get to the market faster than the
competition.

It should also help support domestic industry by use

of tariffs and NTB's that help limit foreign penetration into the
domestic

market,

without

provoking

adverse

reaction

from

the

international community.
Some authors have concluded that Japanese "industrial policy"
is not as successful as it appears to be.

As Murray Weidenbaum

points out, MITI has not helped all the successful industries in
Japan, and has actually hurt some industries that it was trying to
help.u

He further states that:

12

"perhaps the secret of the Japanese miracle has not been
the government's
efforts
to
influence
individual
industries. Rather, the successes of individual Japanese
firms have occurred in an enviroment of low tax rates on
investment, vigorous domestic competition, and heavy
emphasis
on
industrial
engineering
and
process
improvement. lt :l.:l
He concludes that MITI industrial policies of industry-specific
targeting are overrated, and even detrimental to the industry in
question as an industrial policy tool.
However, Weidenbaum's conclusion is entirely consistent with
the theoretical neoclassical conclusions about how to implement
industrial

policy

to

augment

an

economy.

The

Japanese

have

provided a stable environment conducive to economic growth by
providing

lower

government -

tax

rates

on

investment,

saving

incenti ves~4 ,

private sector cooperation on R&D and technology

development projects, and favorable international terms of trade.
Japan

has

thus

competitiveness,

been
which

able
has

to
greatly

increase

productivity

increased

their

and

economic

standing.

other Countries
A second type of policy is modeled after a British ministry,
the

National

Economic

Development

Council.

It

has

administrative power, but can only make recommendations.

no

real

In order

for this arrangement to be effective, the commission members will
have to be in consensus to make their recommendations to Congress
and the President.

Achieving consensus on economic

issues

is

notoriously impossible. The first task that such a committee would
13

have to make is what goals to set, and the representatives from
business, government, and labor may never agree what goals should
be targeted, due to their varied interests.
There

are

then

significant

problems

with

either

type

of

industrial policy.

Each policy, if done wrong, could severely hurt

America's economy.

However, if done right, the benefits from such

a policy could result in increased economic growth and a healthier
American economy.

Which policy, if either, is right for the U.S.?

What should the decision be based on?

What factors should be

considered?

What Can America Learn?
An American industrial policy should take into account the
country's history of past commissions without any administrative
power.

On the whole, they have not been very successful, and when

they have, they have avoided the key issues.

For example,· the

1979-81 Steel Tripartite Committee "did not deal with the subject
of labor-management concessions.
the industry. IPS

It focused on government aid to

This committee did not even deal with the issue

it was created to address.
American politics.

Nor is this a singular occasion in

Consider Kennedy's Advisory Committee on Labor

Management Policy, which never did what it set out to d0 26 ,

or

Carter's Economic Revitalization Board, which never meta7 •
It

would

appear,

then

that

commissions

which

have

no

regulatory or administrative power go unnoticed and do not help
alleviate the problems they were commissioned to address.
14

It would

then

appear

that

an

agency,

if

established

in

an

American

industrial policy, would need some sort of administrative power in
order to be effective.

However, these commissions can have too

much power, and in America, a country where, as Alexander Hamilton
found out in his experiment with the National Bank, the populace
is

inherently distrustful

of

government

intervention

into

the

economy, there would be a significant loss of popular support for
a bureau such as MITI.
A Japanese-type administration indeed brings its own set of
problems.

First, the problem of the disputed effectiveness of MITI

itself shows that this type of policy may not be as effective as
it

seems.

Second,

the

experience

of

France's

Ministry

for

Industrial and Scientific Development shows that such policies may
not

be

successful

at

all.

They

are

however

very

costly

to

implement, so the government should make sure that its taxpayers'
money isn't being wasted on a program doomed to failure.
There is room, however, for compromise for a commission that
is going to set industrial policy.
Brit~sh

First, as suggested by the

model, the commission should try and map out a direction

for the economy; which way does the commission see the economy
going, Where do they want to be, and how are they going to get
there?

Second, give it some, but not too much or too little,

regulatory power.

The committee should not be able to direct

government money to specific industries; they should be allowed to
make such recommendations to Congress, if they so desire, though.
This

commission

should

nevertheless
15

have

the

power

to

set

macroeconomic policy goals in conjunction witn the Federal Reserve
Board

(the

Fed),

in

order

to

make

sure

that

an

environment

conducive to investment is maintained as much as possible.
The committee must develop a cogent strategy for improving
American competitiveness for American firms.

The committee should

also consider how to properly promote investment and savings within
the

economy,

and

work

with

the

Departments

of

Education,

Transportation, Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, and the Treasury to
determine how they can help the economy.

Some committee members

should be from these respective departments as well, as they are
all areas that help the economy grow in the long run.

By doing

this, and providing incentives for economic growth, this type of
committee will combine both aspects of other agencies: it will have
some regulatory power and the ability to make recommendations for
the Congress to act on, but it will essentially be a committee to
establish where economic priorities should be and provide a long
run direction for the American economy and plan on how to get
there.
The American policy body should also have the ability to
impose customs procedures, patent requirements, and other types of
NTB's so that they can increase the competitiveness of domestic
firms.

The committee can weigh the benefits of such policy against

the costs and decide on an appropriate policy that will not hurt
the American economy.

Congress should still have power to set

actual tariffs and VERs and VRAs that require ratification.

Here,

though, the commission should have regulatory power in this area.
16

An American industrial policy commission, then, should be a
conglomeration of British and Japanese models of policy agencies
to handle the distinct problems facing the American economy. What
areas of the economy should they look at?
will they be looking at?

What kind of proposals

How will these proposals be handled?

III. CONTENTS OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY
Industrial policy focuses on one goal: to increase American
international competitiveness.
industrial

policy

productivity grow.

should

In order to do this, an American

include

elements

that

will

help

This is further subdivided into three areas,

infrastructure investment, education/human capital investment, and
science and technology/R&D investment.

These three areas reflect

components of productivity that have declined in recent years.

By

improving these factors, productivity should increase, which should
then increase American competitiveness,

which should help ,the

American economy grow, especially in the international community.
When making policy proposals, the lawmakers first have to
target what areas they want to look at.
policy is included in Table 1.

An

example industrial

Obviously, the policy will probably

want to set up some sort of coordinating agency just discussed.
Next, certain areas need to be targeted so that the government can
subdivide and offer proposals for the specific areas, instead of
trying a blanket approach.
concern.

Obviously, productivity will be a major

ConSUlting Table 1, other areas of importance include the

infrastructure, education, and science and technology including R&D
17

TABLE 1
An Approach to Industrial Policy

Basic Approach
1. Achieving economic growth via a partnership among labor,
small business, larger corporations, universities, and
government.
2. Government plays a creative leadership role.
Major Components
1. A Broad-Based Investment Program
Revitalize basic industries.
Expand growth industries.
Create an environment encouraging investment.
Make sure taxes encourage savings.
Make sure everyone pays fair share.
Invest in new technologies.
Establish goal of committing certain % of GNP to R&D
Provide incentives to entrepeneurs who undertake
high-yield but risky R&D.
Human Capital investment.
More $ for college loan programs.
More competitive faculty salaries in shortage areas.
Invest in pUblic infrastructure.
2. Managed Transitions
.
Give incentives to employers/unions who retrain workers.
Expand co-op efforts to help workers relocate to new jobs.
Provide adjustment assistance to workers to acquire
new skills.
Undertake efforts to train hard to employ youths.
3. An Economic Cooperation Council
Should have ability to assess futre needs, and build
a partnership around solutions to major economic problems.
Should combine economic and political considerations.
Must have wide spread bipartisan support from business and
government, as well as labor.
Its purpose is to establish our national economic goals,
map out a strategy, and marshal our resources for
meeting them.
=======~========================================================~=======

Source:

Weidenbaum, Murray L.
Business, Government, and the Public.
3rd. ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1986, p. 242
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concerns.

These areas have their own unique concerns and problems,

but they all are vital to economic well-being.

Their problems

should then be addressed in a forum considering the problems of
industry.

As the sample outline in Table 1 suggests, they shall

be included here, as well.

The Administrative Agency
Research indicates that best type of American policy to adopt
will

be one that can have

a

little

regulatory power,

but be

primarily an advisory board that can set certain goals for the
economy.

To this end, President Clinton has proposed an Economic

Security Council (ESC), "similar to the National Security council.
[NSC]"n

The NSC is a statutory agency created in 1947 to "advise

the president· and to help him coordinate the activities of the
major

policy agencies. 11 29

foreign

The goal

of the NSC

is

to

coordinate all the appropriate agencies under a single foreign
policy.30

Presumably,

coordinate

the

an ESC would have the same type of

various

agencies

involved

under

one

job:

cohesive

economic policy.
Just as the NSC involves the president, the vice president,
the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, the secretaries of State
and Defense, the director of the CIA, and the national security
advisoe\ the ESC should include the president, the vice president,
the Fed chairman, the secretaries of Education, Transportation,
Agricul ture,

Commerce,

economic advisor.

Labor,

and the Treasury,

and a national

It should also include, however, Senators and
19

Congresspeople from both parties,

private corporation leaders,

labor union leaders, and small business representatives.

While

this is quite a large committee, it will represent a good mix
of pUblic/private,

labor/management,

and executive/legislative/

bureaucratic cross-sections that can air out their own views on
economic policy matters.

President Clinton has not yet specified

any such committee organization, however.

One of his campaign

promises on 13 August 1992 to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council
was

to

"create

an

Economic

Security

National Security Council."u

Council,

similar

to

the

He has yet to act on that promise.O

This agency would most likely replace the Vice President's
Competitiveness

Council.

Congress

has

cut

funding

and

has

threatened to eliminate the office altogether, because of its slant
to

business

during

the

Bush

presidency.

The

Council

issued

recommendations in favor of government non-intervention in the
economy, and other "pro-business" recommendations 33 •

Also, i tdid

not have any regulatory power, and was a very weak organization
politically, as well, that faced a hostile Congress, and was led
by a politically impotent vice president.

Hence, the ESC proposed

here would be better positioned to listen to the concerns of all
groups, and be politically
the COuncilor deny

well~balanced so

funding

for

neither party eliminate

purely political

reasons,

as

appears to be the case with the Competitiveness Council.
The agency proposed by Clinton, the ESC, offers many of the
advantages

already

discussed

about

a

mixture

of

British agency models, if implemented as described.
20

Japanese

and

First, it has

Ii ttle or

no direct regulatory power,

thinktank for policymakers.

but

it

is more

than a

Second, the mechanism is different,

with the Council making its recommendations to the president and
Congress,

so

that

cooperation

government can be fostered.

between

the

two

branches

of

Third, it is definitely designed to

coordinate economic policy, which is of vital importance in the
government.

These aspects of the ESC are consistent with the

committee approach developed earlier, with less regulatory power
than envisioned, but maybe even more effective, if the Council can
be put into effective practice.
The

agency

approach

is

one

of

many

made

in

the

recent

campaign. Several other proposals were made as well, concerning a
variety of issues that affect the nation's economic health.

These

issues include'productivity, infrastructure investment, education
reform, and science and technology policy that includes R&D.

These

areas are all in need of different types of proposals.

productivity Concerns
Looking back at Chart 1, notice that it graphs output per hour
over different time periods.
measure

of

productivity.

output per manhour
others

include

is

output

compensation as in Charts 2 and 3, respectively.

a

common

and

hourly

Output is the

most direct measure of what a country produces, and can reflect
productivi ty ,

although not as accurate as output per manhour.

Hourly compensation is a proxy for the average wage rate, which
theoretically reflects productivity, as well, and can proxy it,
21
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too.

On Chart 2, America falls in the middle of growth, but on

Chart 3, it falls dead last out of the 12 countries surveyed, as
it is on Chart 1.

These charts show America's lagging

productivity, and has caused economists to ask what has caused this
drop.
The answers, as can be expected, are quite varied.

Some of

the literature focuses on technical change, as SolowJ · , Romer 35 , and
Ethier36 •

The basic conclusion from these authors is that technical

change, not a change in the labor/capital ratio, is responsible for
much of the productivity growth, although the magnitude of this
change

is disputed.

Other authors,

such as

Nelson 38 argue that another force is at work.
argument, know as convergence theory,

Abramovitz 37

and

Collectively, their

states that productivity

levels of countries will tend to converge over time.

The United

states, which has led this category for most of the century, is
just experiencing a natural phenomenon.
Convergence
explanation.

theory

probably

plays

some

role

in

the

As Nelson states, though, "the 'followers' spend a

higher percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GOP) on R&D than the
'leader' (the United States). n 39 If this is the case, then bringing
R&O

spending in line to a similar percentage of GOP, would break

this trend of convergence.

Therefore, there is a stronger element

than convergence that plays a role in productivity changes. If it
is technical change, or a change in the labor/capital ratio, then
they can be made targets for policies that can improve these
statistics, and thereby increase productivity growth.
24

Productivity has been a topic where several policies have been
proposed,

as

well.

Some

proposals

cite

productivity and infrastructure investment 4o •
knowledge and education 41 •

the

link

between

others cite

still others cite science and

technology, along with R&D 4 ' .

All three of these areas can help

increase productivity growth, in the medium to long run.

It is

therefore useful to look to these separate areas to see how the
government can help enhance productivity.

Infrastructure
Some
"America's

call

the

Third

lack

of

Deficit,,·3

recent
to

show

infrastructure
just

infrastructure is to the American economy.
Ilbecause the elements of core

output.

It··

in

the

infrastructure are

ThUS,

determination

the

total

intrinsic to

they are especially
national

economic

infrastructure investment is seen as a

player in productivity growth.
fallen off.

of

important

As David Aschauer says:

almost every sector of private production,
influential

how

investment

major

Yet infrastructure investment has

As a result, so has productivity growth, according to

proponents of this theory.
President

Clinton,

recognizing

this,

has

proposed

that

infrastructure spending be increased as much as $134 billion in the
next four years. 45

This is part of his long-term plan to help

revitalize the economy.

The $134 billion would be spent on road

improvements, and new roads and rails, including block grants to
states for infrastructure investment 4e •
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Some of his long-range

goals

include

a

fiber

optic

network

that

links

all

homes,

businesses, and schools by 2015, and rigorous investment strategies
for the future.
This plan may run into problems, though, in getting passed
through Congress.

First, according to some, the deficit must be

taken care of before public infrastructure investment will have its
effect. 4?

The deficit in and of itself is an almost inconceivably

big obstacle; if that hurdle must be in effect cleared before
meaningful investment can take place on the infrastructure,

then

government is going to let infraStructure investment oontinue its
downward trend and tackle the larger problem of the deficit and not
waste

the money

on

infrastructure

investment.

If,

however,

infrastructure investment is not crowded out by the deficit, then
the infrastructure investment can have a very real effect on the
economy, if it does not add to the national debt.

Education
Former President Bush said: "Education is the one investment
that means more for our future because it means the most for our
children. U 4S

Current President Bill Cl inton and several other

prominent figures in the American pUblic found education to be the
number one priority facing America today.49

Admittedly, Bush and

Clinton did not agree on much, but they both agree that eduoation
is a very important concept.
run,

R&D.

5(1

Experience

After all, education is, in the long

further

indicates

increasingly more important, as well.
26

that

it may become

As an economy matures, its

focus shifts from manufacturing to service oriented jobs, at least
prima facie in the United states and the EEC.

Service sector jobs

generally require more and more educated workers in order for them
to grow.5l.

As the service sector in the U.S. continues to grow,

the need for a more and better educated work force will also
continue to grow.
It seems that nearly everyone agrees that American schools
need improvement.

Statistics abound that American schools are

being outperformed by foreign competition in sUbjects such as math
and science.

Yet our Congress cannot agree on the solution to one

of the biggest problems we as Americans face.

Bush wanted to be

lithe Education President, II but the Congress, controlled by the
Democrats, never fully considered his proposals.

When they did

compromise with the GOP, as on the NSIA, the Democrats reneged on
their concession at the last minute, leaving the GOP congresspeople
angry and the legislation dead in the water.
The first problem American schools must face is developing a
national educational philosophy.

As David Steiner says:

II

by

decentralizin9 education, we admit that no overarching substantive
narrative binds the nation, that no inherited wisdom offers a
universally persuasive vision of educated citizens. liS.

By not

having a national focus, then, there is no comprehensive philosophy
that underpins the education American children receive, short of
local wisdom.

The country cannot then expect uniformity in quality

of education or the availability of programs to all youth, because
as communities surely differ, their programs and outcomes will also
27

differ.

Education reform cannot succeed either, as the differences

in individual programs can alter the effect national policies have
on locally run school systems.
philosophy

can

foster

Therefore, a national focus and

uniformity

in

quality

and

quantity

of

education, and equal application of government policies across the
country.
After

this

initial

questions still remain.

problem

is

addressed,

several

other

First, how can the federal government

improve the quality education for everybody?

What must students

learn to be competitive in the global economy?

With few financial

resources available, are there valid, low-cost ideas?63

These are

just a few of the questions that Clinton's education policy must
address over the next four years.
The first-question stems from the national philosophy.

The

biggest contribution the federal government can make at this stage
is to develop a comprehensive educational philosophy that 'can
achieve a large consensus among the electorate.

After this, the

federal government can set up national standards for schools and
set up new and innovative programs for schools to use to improve
the quality of educational services available.

These programs,

however, can only supplement the local school initiatives, because
the primary source of funding is not the federal government, but
the local school systems themselves.

The biggest contribution at

the federal level will be to focus education in America on the same
set of goals and educational maxims that can promote uniformity in
school systems across the country.
28

Second, what should students learn in order to be competitive
in the global economy?

According to the Department of Labor Report

issued on 2 July 1991, Students should master the 5 "competencies"
-- reading, writing, math, speaking, and listening.

Also, students

should be able to think creatively, make decisions, solve problems,
and reason.

Schools should help develop responsibility, self

esteem, sociability, and integrity among the students, as well. 54
Labor lists these as the minimum requirements for people to be able
to be competitive in the global labor markets.

These goals can

serve as basic guidelines for a national philosophy of education,
and national requirements can be developed from them, as well.
Third, with few financial resources, are there valid low-cost
innovations?

The answer is yes.

Conservative Republicans have

been pushing for public/private school choice with no success over
the last four years, despite the fact that it is a relatively low
cost solution to education problems (Democrats, by way of contrast,
have often pushed for complete federal funding of programs already
in place,

such as Head Start). 55

Intense partisanship and a

gridlocked Congress, and House Education and Labor committee are
often cited as the reason for inaction on this particular program,
and similar proposals of the Bush Administration. 56
Other innovations are possible,

though,

without being as

politically divisive as school choice vouchers.

These programs

center around encouraging parents to play an active role in their
children's education.

To this end,

Patrick Welsh,

himself a

schoolteacher, observes that: "the kids who do well, whether they
29

be rich or poor, have one thing in common: parents or some other
adult in their lives who have put a premium on education and have
pushed them. 11 57 Therefore, getting parents involved and interested
will help improve the schools -- without specific federal aid for
education -- by improving attitudes toward education from the home
front.

Obviously, not all students start out equally from a family

standpoint,

either,

given current trends

in family structure.

However, programs to address these problems, although important to
education and increasing the economic well-being of the lower-class
and single-parent households, are not within the scope of this
paper.

What is within its scope, however, is what has our new

President has promised to improve education in order to improve
competitiveness in the long run.
Clinton has focused on education as one of four major target
areas for his administration.!l8

To this end, he has several ideas

on ways to improve education and human capital investment.

These

include improving early childhood education, revamping financial
aid, and job training/apprenticeship proqrams. Sg

Other proposals

include a European-style tax cut for corporations sponsoring worker
training.

These programs have three different foci: making sure

kids can start school relatively equally, making sure college is
affordable for all, and providing training for good jobs for non
college-bound youths.

Programs such as these, it is argued, can

do a lot for advancing future prosperity. 60
In improving early childhood education, Clinton wants programs
such as Head start to be fully implemented.
30

All too often, poorer

children, especially from the inner cities with the poorest school
systems in the nation, start school at a disadvantage due to their
poverty.

In order for these children to have a chance to compete

in their future, special programs like Head start must be fully
implemented. other proposals, such as child care subsidies or tax
incentives, can help, too.

As child care becomes more affordable,

more single mothers, the most impoverished demographic group, can
afford to work instead of staying home raising their children.
This allows, them to rise out of poverty, which increase the chance
of the children to be better educated through a
atmosphere, etc.

better home

By focusing on the child care and preschool

years, Clinton, like other liberals, hopes to increase the pre
school and early childhood education, most of which goes on outside
the home, and can be a very important determinant of future success
for the child.
The second target of the Clinton administration concerns ·the
rising

costs

of

college.

As

the

service

sector

becomes

increasingly predominant in America, more and more education is
needed.

Thus, more students will go into higher education of some

type.

As

demand

for

education

increases,

higher

learning

institutions need more resources, which raises the cost of higher
education.

This is a trend which has spiralled upward in recent

years in America.
However, this is only partially true in reality.

The supply

of college students is increasing, because more and more, companies
simply cannot hire workers straight out of high school.
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This trend

is only partially offset by the rising costs; most students and
families simply have to pay the increase.

Those that are forced

out of education, though, are going to be the lower class students
wi thout a lot of resources at their disposal, arguably the one
group of students who could benefit from going to college the most.
Students do receive a lot of federal student loans and grants.
However, it still may not be enough to offset the cost of college
if it is anything less than the full amount.

Other needy students

who need just as much financial aid, may not, under the current
restrictions, be getting enough aid to allow them to go to school.
For these reasons, President Clinton has proposed to revamp
the federal student financial aid system. 61

His proposals include

working off student loans by government community service hours,
and making the'aid received more "equitable".

These programs are

intended to allow more students the opportunity to attend college
and better prepare themselves for the job markets of the future.
Obviously,

as

students

become

better

educated

(and

more

knowledgeable), their productivity will increase, which will help
America be more competitive globally.
The third and final focal point of his education/human capital
policy is the plight of the non-college bound youth.

As the

service sector demands a better educated work force, high school
graduates simply do not possess the required skills.

This leaves

only blue collar-type manufacturing and other industrial jobs open
that

are

good

enough

to

make

a

living.

These

jobs,

as

manufacturing dwindles, simply are not available to accommodate the
32

needs of those graduating high school each year.
high

school

graduates

that

do

not

go

increasingly bleak job market and future.

to

As a result,

college

face

an

Clinton's job training/

apprenticeship program aims to alleviate this troublesome trend.
As he promised the United Auto Workers convention in San Diego on
15 June 1992, "for the kids who don't want to go to college, we'll
restore

the

dignity

of

blue-collar

work

by

guaranteeing

an

apprenticeship program to every non-college bound student in the
U. S • ,,63

President Clinton offers several new programs to increase the
future competitiveness of America, through various policies in
infrastructure and human capital/education investment.

He also

highlights a third area that can be just as important in shoring
up

American

technology.

competitiveness

the

near

future,

science

and

Once, America dominated these areas, but now others

have caught up.
also

in

includes

By inclUding a science and technology policy, that
R&D

policies,

America

can

further

improve

its

competitive position in the international economy.

Science and Technology
In the period immediately prior to WWII, the united States led
not

only

the

economic

development

technological development, as well.
Japan developed,

though,

of

the

world,

but

The two go hand in hand.

its
As

it was able to adapt basic scientific

advancements from other countries, especially the U.S., and turn
them into usable and marketable technologies faster than the parent
33

country could.
cheaper,

It was thus able to exploit technology and produce

higher

quality

products,

in

for

example

the

steel

industry.
While America still leads in basic science research, it is now
losing the battle to bring these new advances to the new market the
quickest.

The problem, then, is not in the basic research, it

G3

is in converting this research into a usable technology; after all,
science and technology are two different animals. 64

Thus, America

is no longer as competitive in developing new technology as it was.
The questions then are what can be done to restore America's
technological competitiveness?, and how can R&D policy help America
regain its competitive edge in technology development?
In order to answer the first question, areas where R&D are
lagging need to be identified.
the

u.s.

It has already been mentioned that

is still leading in basic science, but is faltering in the

race to develop technology from it quickly.

It therefore makes

sense to put more effort into developing the basic science that
America

can

technologies.

still

do

better

than

anyone

else

into

usable

By pushing development, America can bring the new

technologies to market quicker and have a more competitive position
in new markets and industries that will be born in the future.
Answering the second question also helps answering the first
question.

Consider the current makeup of federal R&D spending as

in Chart 4.

The chart shows that in 1988, almost 70% of the

federal R&D budget was spent in the Department of Defense, and just
above 30% on "civilian" R&D.

with the soviet Union extinct and no
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C AR 4
Federal R&D Funding, 1988, by Dept.
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major power surfacing as an enemy, there is an increasing call for
the government to cut defense spending, especially on R&D.

While

cutting R&D may not sound like it would help the economy, in this
case it can.
Military R&D and NASA R&D, like "Big Science" projects such
as the Superconducting Super Collider (Dept. of Energy) do not have
any readily commercial benefits.

Therefore, less than 27% of the

federal R&D budget is going for civilian purposes, to help promote
new technologies and developments that can help American
competitiveness.

These projects are often more modest in scope,

but have a higher impact per dollar than the big ticket items.

It

therefore can help the economy if the R&D can be adjusted to show
a prototypical distribution reflecting parity among commercial and
non-commercial 'concerns , such as Chart 5.
distribution may look like,

This shows what a future

if the defense/civilian R&D split

returned to pre-1980 levels. 65

This division reflects the future

prospects of both the defense and civilian R&D requirements in the
battle for federal funding.

Policies should be implemented to get

civilian R&D, the more modest proposals that can really have high
benefit per dollar ratios, and defense/non commercial spending to
relatively equal levels.
Once money is allocated to civilian R&D, where does it go?
There are three possibilities.

It can go to a government lab, a

private company, or a university.

More and more, the funds are

being used jointly by two or more of these groups.

Cooperative

Research And Development Agreements (CRADAS) help both the private
36
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and government sectors by sharing R&D costs.

They are temporary

agreements, semi-market driven, with set targets, and the results
eventually become common property. 66

Their use in the federal R&D

plan is growing, as the private sector is more willing to share the
costs this way.

Also, government research grants to universities

are tending to increase as well, showing greater cooperation and
interdependency among the academic, pUblic, and private sectors of
the nation.
The changing face of government R&D, in its distribution among
government
private

departments

and

and

academic

the

increasing

sectors,

will

involvement
help

of

increase

the
the

competitiveness of American firms as new products can be developed
here.

The questions remain, though, how could the government's

industrial

policy

competiti veness,

help

America

regain

technological

and what has President Clinton proposed for a

science/technology/R&D policy?
Government

policy

can

help

increase

American

competitive

positioning by focusing on the process of developing new and better
technologies.

As

stated earlier,

the problem lies not in the

research, but in the development end of the spectrum.

Therefore,

the government should offer incentives, maybe in the form of tax
breaks

and/or

priority

in

CRADAs

and

other

encourage firms to develop the products faster.

R&D

projects,

to

Also one problem

may be that too many people are not getting enough information.
To this end, and technological extension service, similar to the
agricul tural service,

should be formed
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to teach companies

and

manufacturers about the latest technologies available for their
use. 61
Another concern some authors have is that American firms have
not realized how technology development has changed since WWII.
Traditionally, development flowed in a straight line from research.
Today,

though,

there is no direct line from basic research to

teohnology; it is more of a fusion of several different processes
into one technology.E8

This makes consolidation and resource

sharing all the more important as a tool of American R&D policy,
because it can accelerate the rate at which ideas can be shared and
fused into a usable technology.
Hence,
civilian

the

R&D,

government
and

promote

should

first

incentives

development of -new technologies.

equalize
which

defense

will

and

stimulate

This can include cooperation with

the private and academic sectors, an organization that can help
consolidate new technologies and teach people how to use them, ,and
to develop a "database" so that different research can be joined
together to develop a new technology quicker.

President Clinton,

though, has made some proposals which fit in very well with this
plan of attack.
Clinton has made several proposals in this area.

First, he

promised that "for every dollar we reduce the defense bUdget on
research and development, we'll increase the civilian R&D budget
by the same amount. ,,69

He also will make the R&D tax credit

permanent, and propose a 50% tax credit to long-term investors in
new businesses. 70

He further states that "at the very least, 10%
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of the $76 billion that the government now spends on research
should

be

redirected

from

the

pentagon's

research

budget

to

civilian efforts. tl 7l These proposals are designed to help stimulate
R&D

and

technology

growth.

This

will

in

theory

boost

competitiveness in current and future industries that rely on ever
advancing technology in order to be competiti ve.

He wants to boost

science and technology, especially the latter, which have declined,
and as a result, so has America's competitiveness.

IV.

THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND THE MODEL

Both economics and politics are disciplines where general
consensus is rarely achieved.

The question of feasibility, then,

ultimately depends on the perspective taken by the reader.
mainstream economic theory is neoclassical economics.
realism assumes that politicians'

The

Political

goals are to get re-elected.

Since these are the mainstream paradigms, they are employed here,
as well.

After a

discussion of the respective frameworks,

a

methodology incorporating them will be developed that can evaluate
industrial

policy

proposals

put

forth

by

the

Clinton

administr tion.

The Theories
The Economic Model
In order

for

the

policy to

be

successful,

American firms compete internationally.
40

it must

Therefore,

help

the proper

economic model must focus on America's position in international
trade.

The mainstream approach to international trade economics

is the neoclassical model of indifference curve analysis 72 •

There

are several important implications of this framework.

First, when

productivity

the

declines

relative

to

the

rest

of

world,

competitiveness suffers, as costs are increasing relative to the
rest of the world.

Second, tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTB's)

are commonly used to protect a domestic market and/or industry from
foreign competition; there is economic gain from such protectionist
measures for those countries that employ them, relative to the more
open markets.

Given the implications of the neoclassical model,

an industrial policy that focuses on improving productivity and
either opening all markets or using tariffs and NTB's to augment
its strategy can prove very effective for a country wishing to reap
economic gains from the international marketplace.

Our focus will

be on policies aiming at increasing productivity.

The Political Model
The political framework is relatively simple.

A politicians'

main goal is to get re-elected, or put in different terms, to
maximize his/her probability of re-election.

American politicians

are theoretically very sensitive to their constituencies in the
sense that they will re-elect him in as little as two years.
cannot

afford to

do

anything

for

the

long

committing political suicide in the short run.

run

it

means

Since the House of

Representatives is re-elected every two years,
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if

They

and the Senate

serves 6-year terms, this can produce some very myopic policy.
Political plausibility, then, entails several elements for its
framework.
can get

First, it must allow that Congresspeople and Senators

re-elected

in the

intrinsically long run.

short

run,

while

the

effective,

as

are

Second, it must reach across party lines

and appeal to both Democrats and Republicans.
cost

policies

big

bUdget

items

are

Third, it must be
generally

met

with

disapproval by the electorate.

Methodology
A proposed industrial policy must be evaluated on both its
economics and politics.

In order to evaluate its economics, goals

of what an industrial policy should achieve should be kept in mind.
Put simply, tfiis is increased competitiveness in the global market
place.

As noted above, this can theoretically have two parts:

increasing productivity or ensuring a "level playing field" in the
international

market.

Hence,

the

economic

feasibility

of

a

proposal should hinge on whether it help foster growth in one or
both of these areas, and how it would so.

Simply put, does the

proposal help foster increased competitiveness?

By what means?

These are not the only questions that can determine economic
plausibility, though.

If there is a better economic alternative

(political acceptance notwithstanding for the moment), it should
be ranked even more feasible than the previous proposal.
proposals,
condition

then,
of

The

can be ranked in order of preference on the

feasibility.

For
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example,

a

treaty

that

would

eliminate tariffs and NTB's in all nations would be favored to one
that

increases

tariffs.

strategies, though.

Both

do

have

economically

sound

If these were the only two policies being

considered, in terms of feasibility, the tariff elimination is more
economically sound, and would be reflected in a ranking of 1, while
the tariff hike would be ranked second.
Ranking different proposals can be very helpful in selecting
the optimal policy.

However, it again depends on the individual

analyst; it is by no means an objective ranking like a list of GPA
scores would be; it simply reflects which policy proposal the
individual would prefer over another.
Political feasibility is analyzed in the same way, with the
different proposals being ranked in terms of political feasibility.
Political feasibility depends on the effect on a given politician's
chance for re-election, the nature of bipartisanship surrounding
the proposal, and its total cost.

For example, raising an income

tax on the middle class is politically unfeasible, because voters
tend to replace those representatives that vote for a tax hike.
The more Republicans and Democrats agree on a course of action, the
more politically viable a resolution becomes and the higher it is
ranked

in this

category.

Likewise,

cost

can

undermine

the

political possibility if it is too high.
Now suppose that the two proposals, a tariff reduction and the
tariff hike, are evaluated for their political feasibility.

Here,

the tariff hike could be more feasible, because it could be cheaper
to implement, and less risky to pass.
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Therefore the hike would get

a ranking of 1, while the reduction would be ranked 2.
these

rankings

are

highly

sUbjective,

depending

Again,
upon

an

individual's own point-of-view.
The next problem is how to combine political and economic
feasibility into the same model.
established for both parts,

Once the rankings have been

the temptation to simply add them

together, and prefer the lower composite score, is great.
considering the

example developed here,

the simple

However,

sum is

as

follows:
policy

Economic

±

Political =

TOTAL

TARIFF HIKE

2

1

3

TARIFF REDUCTION

1

2

3

How then is the final

decision in this case?

equally feasible overall.

Both plans are

How does Congress decide?

Given the

political realities of the decision-making bodies, they probably
attach more weight to the political aspect than the economic.

This

makes sense, given that politicians will focus on re-election, not
necessarily on what is good for the economy if it conflicts with
their political aspirations.
simply mUltiply it by 2.

To weight the political feasibility,
This gives more weight to political

considerations over economic factors.

The table then may look like

this:
(Weighted)
Policy

Economic

+

Political 

TOTAL

TARIFF HIKE

2

2

4

TARIFF REDUCTION

1

4

5
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Here, the decision, is clear.

With the weight to the political

factors, the decision is for the tariff hike in this example.
One problem that is apparent is the problem of the scalar.
For simplicity, I chose a weight of 2.

This works well when only

two

When

policies

are

being

considered.

more

than

two

are

compared, the weight given to political feasibility does matter.
Thus,

if

more

than

two

policies

are

attention must be paid to the weight.

being

compared,

special

Here, however, since only

two policies are being compared, the weight does not matter.
The model then,

simply ranks the weighted preferences for

policies with both economic and political components, as such:
Total Rank

=

Economic Rank + 2*Political Rank

for each policy proposal.

These rankings will implicitly reflect

the costs and benefits, both economic and political, of the various
policies.

It cannot, however,

serve as a measure of magnitude

between the pOlicies, i.e. how much policy 1 is preferred to policy
2, and so on.

It is also possible that the number one policy

preference is to do nothing pursue.

This option can simply be

reflected as a policy choice among the alternatives.
Each proposal, then, will be ranked against a null hypothesis.
The null hypothesis here is that what the government does now, in
terms of policy and spending, will not increase.

The policy with

the lowest total will be the more feasible of the two policies, and
is the one that should be preferred.
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TABLE 2
Clinton's Industrial Policy Proposals
Infrastructure
Pl Increase infrastructure investment by $l34b over the next
four years.
Education
P2 Improve early childhood education (fully fund Head start).
P3 Revamp the college financial aid program.
P4 Initiate job training/ apprenticeship programs for non
college bound students.
P5 A European-style tax cut for companies sponsoring worker
training.
Science, Technology, and R&D
P6 Decrease defense R&D by at least 10%.
P7 Match every dollar decrease in defense R&D with a dollar
increase in civilian R&D.
P8 Make the R&D tax credit permanent.
P9 A 50% ta~ credit to long-term investors in new businesses.

==;====:=-=========================-=:===========================================
Sources: see text under the Contents of Industrial Policy
section. The numbers Pl through P9 simply refer to proposal
1 through 9.
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important

factor

to

consider,

especially against

a

do-nothing

policy that can plunge America into further economic decline.

For

these reasons, the economic rank is 2, as is the political rank.

Infrastructure
The

first

proposal

is

Clinton's

plan

to

increase

infrastructure investment by $134 billion over the next four years.
Economically, this is a very good proposal,

as "countries that

provide high public investment in infrastructure experience higher
productivity growth,1t 73
infrastructure

and also economic growth. 74

is decaying,

and will

The American

continue to

Congress decides to appropriate funds for it.

do

so

until

It is better than

doing nothing because productivity should grow as the investment
is completed, thus helping our competitiveness.

While

Poli tically,

however,

congress

recognizes

it

is more feasible

the

need

for

more

to do nothing.
infrastructure

investment, Clinton is asking for them to cut the budget deficit
and try to pass a multi-billion dollar infrastructure bill at the
same time,

with no or

few specific spending cuts.

President

Clinton has some pet projects, namely health care reform, that he
considers a higher priority over infrastructure investment.

Given

this environment, and the treatment of the economic stimulus bill
in the Senate recently,

it would be very surprising to Congress

enact an infrastructure investment bill.
Clinton's infrastructure proposal does not fare well here.
While it is the more economically sound, and receives a I , the
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political ranking is 4, for a total of 5.

Compared with the null

hypothesis that government infrastructure spending stay at current
levels, with a total of 4 (2 and 2 respectively), this proposal
would fail.

Education
In his attempt to reform education, Clinton has made several
policy proposals.

First is to improve early childhood education

by fUlly funding Head start.

To analyze its economic feasibility,

consider the cost of the program to reach every eligible child.
In cold economic terms, the opportunity cost to the government is
extremely high.

Obviously, the benefits are apparent, because

students in Head start can begin school at the same level as their
peers, and will increase their human capital investment so that
they can compete.
Head

start

and

However, if given a choice between fully funding
infrastructure

investment,

the

infrastructure

investment is probably the more economically viable of the two.
Politically, on the other hand, if Congress can again come up
with some of the money, they may be willing to fund it fully over
doing nothing at all.

First, it is in essence a social program,

too, that can help impoverished children have a fighting chance to
escape destitution.

Second, it is a long-run measure designed to

help increase the productivity of the

future

Congress will want to see it as that way.

work force,

Third,

if

it has the

appearance of "putting people ahead of economics" because its
social

ramifications

are

more
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observable

than

its

economic

implications.
alternative.

For these

reasons,

it

is

a

politically viable

This does not mean Congress will or should pass the

program, it simply says that it could be better for them to pass
it than to do nothing.
The

second

education

financial aid system.

proposal

is

to

revamp

the

college

This will allow more people to be better

trained, which improves the overall education and productivity of
the labor force in the long run, because college is more affordable
in the short run.

Economically, this is feasible, as it is a long

term R&D investment that can payoff dividends well
future.

There

has

always

been

a

correlation

into the

between

higher

education and higher productivity, so economically it is a sound
proposal.
Poli tically, though, it is hard to estimate.

On the one hand,

the problem of where the money is coming from lessens the chance
for it to pass.

On the other hand, it too can pass as a social

program that can show that Congress is helping the people.

Very

few people are happy with the financial aid system today, though,
parents

students,

and

educators

alike.

Therefore,

there

is

considerable impetus from the academic and household sectors for
the government to initiate some type of reform.
this I

the House Education and Labor committee,

In addition to
which has been

gridlocked the past four years, is just now realizing that it can
end the gridlock conveniently enough for Clinton to step into the
White

House.

It

may

be

likely,

therefore,

that

political

cooperation on education issues will increase, which may make the
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financial aid reform idea more politically feasible than doing
nothing at all.
The third of the four education proposals is the job training
apprenticeship

programs.

Economically,

investment is a very sound idea,

this

human

capital

if the jobs are available;

it

doesn't do the workers any good to train for nonexistent jobs.
Therefore, a gener 1 type of training must be undertaken that can
be adapted to new and better technologies, and the government and
companies must be willing to retrain workers
different jobs.

for

the

new and

Once these guidelines are set, the labor force

moves from unskilled to skilled, and can be more productive and
therefore competitive in the future, an economically sound idea,
that Morton Kondracke says may be Cl inton' s best. 75
Like

the:

other

education

proposals,

this

idea

is

also

politically feasible, depending on how Congress wants to tackle the
deficit,

if

at

all.

The

added

advantage

this

program

has,

especially for the Democrats, is the addition of large number of
potentially employed blue collar workers that become voters in the
very short run.

If the program works, the current Congress, and

the Democrats in particular,
collar

generation

to

its

can stand to gain an entire blue

side

if

the

program

succeeds.

In

addition, this is one of the top programs that President Clinton
wants enacted,

so as

a

pet project of

a

newly elected Chief

Executive, it becomes even more politically viable.
then both economically and politically feasible.
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This plan is

The final education proposal is also both economically and
politically feasible.
companies

sponsoring

This is the European-style tax cut for
worker

training.

Economically,

it

will

effectively subsidize worker training, making it less costly to
compete,

and/or

increasing the number

of

people

that

can be

trained.

Either way, the economic ramifications of a tax cut will

spur worker training and help to increase productivity.
Politically, a tax cut is always acceptable.

However, for

Clinton and the current Congress who are dealing with a variety of
tax increases, showing the ability to cut a couple of taxes for the
purpose of spurring investment growth (supply-side economics)" may
be a meaningful concession to get the
proposals.

GOP

behind some of the

By relying on a supply-side tax cut t the Democrats can

show a willingness to compromise, which increases their bargaining
position for some more divisive issues down the road.

The bottom

line is, though, that a tax cut is virtually always politically
acceptable, even in the face of a budget deficit crisis that faces
this country.

R&D
The R&D proposals also have interesting economic and political
ramifications.

First are the twin proposals to cut defense R&D by

at least 10%, and to match this with an increase in civilian R&D.
Economically, this simply reallocates government money to areas
where it can benefit the American economy the most in terms of
increasing R&D support and developing new technologies.
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This will

help develop new technologies, which can lower production costs,
and

also increase productivity.

By maintaining the status quo,

civilian R&D remains vastly underfunded, the military overfunded,
especially in the post- Cold War era, and the economy loses a
valuable source of potential R&D growth.

For these reasons, these

proposals are economically viable.
Politically, the substantial decrease in available R&D moneys
will not make special interests within the military-industrial
complex particularly happy.
downsized,

However, as the military is being

it makes sense to shift R&D from the military to

civilian pursuits.

The proposal is deficit-proof,

because it

simply reallocates funds from one source to another; the overall
balance stays the same.

Plus it has an increased economic benefit

for the private sector at a relatively low opportunity cost for the
government.

It therefore makes sense that the government would

enact these proposals, at least in part.
The third proposal Clinton makes for R&D is to make the R&D
tax credit permanent.
correct,

and

a

This is both economically and politically

concession

to

supply-side

economists

of

both

parties, for many of the same reasons that the worker training tax
cut is acceptable both on economic and political terms.

It is

always politically advantageous to cut a tax, especially if people
expect tax increases.
The same holds true for the fourth and final proposal, the R&D
tax credit of

50%

to

long-term investors

in

new businesses.

Unfortunately, the economics behind this proposal are not as sound
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as the politics.

By providing a tax incentive, the government

tacitly hopes that more people will invest in new business.

the

number of businesses then goes up, which increases competition.
Unless the government specifies the industries which would get the
tax break, if there are restrictions, this does not help increase
the R&D or productivity at all.

It is therefore a

misguided

industrial policy, despite its political correctness.

VI.

CONCLUSIONS

The results obtained here suggest that for the most part,
Clinton's

industrial

policy proposals

are

against what the government is doing now.
infallible,

however,

as

research has encountered.

there

are

feasible

when

ranke

These results are not

several

problems

that

this

These problems force readers to be

cautious when interpreting the data, and reduce the overall level
of condfidence in the results.

Despite these misgivings, however,

the results seem to suggest that Clinton's policy proposals may be
able

to work.

Further research

is needed to develop

a

more

objective method of analysis and better data, and to evaluate other
proposals, as well.

Results
Table 3 provides a summary of the Clinton proposals, and how
they

fared

against the

null

proposals.

Generally,

Clinton I s

proposals turn out fairly favorable against the null hypothesis.
This makes a case in general for an industrial policy, containing
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TABLE 3
Clinton's Industrial Policy Proposals Evaluated
Feasibility
(Weighted)
Economic
Political

Policy

Total

Agency
ESC
Null

1
2

4
2

5

I

4
2

5

2

P2

2

2

4

Null

1

4

5

P3

1

2

3

Null

2

4

6

P4

1
2

2
4

3
6

1
2

2
4

3
6

Infrastructure
PI
Null

4

4

Education

Null
P5

Null
R&D
P6 & P7
Null

1

2

2

4

3
6

pa

1

Null

2

2
4

6

P9

2
1

2
4

4
5

Null

3

==========::::::::=========='========:::===.===================::::=====.=====
Source: the text. The null total is the toal value that the nu
hypothesis received, which was to keep the current governm
in place. For example, P2 ranked as more feasible than th
hypothesis, because it had a lower score, 4 to 5.

at least some of these proposals.

The only policy that would not

prove to be more feasible than the null hypothesis is the first
policy, increasing infrastructure investment.

In many ways, it is

definitely the most economically sound of the proposals.

However,

compared to the public attention on education and private sector
concern

over

unacceptable.

R&D

policy,

infrastructure

becomes

politically

Politics in this example can effectively undermine

a very sound economic proposal.
This

research

also

suggests

that

programs

that

pay

for

themselves, such as the combination of policies 6 and 7, are going
to be more politically OK than ones which require new spending.
The source of this new spending for the infrastructure program was
not specified.
federal

As a result, it would have added over $130b to the

deficit.

Considering

Clinton's pet projects,

the

deficit

he shoots himself

infrastructure investment.

itself
in the

is
foot

one

of

on the

The change in R&D distribution does not

face this problem, because it merely is a transfer of funds from
one department to another, without changing the balance of the
deficit.

It is therefore deficit-proof, and programs which can be

deficit-proof will also be politically feasible.
These preliminary conclusions also imply that education reform
and improvement could be a very feasible undertaking politically.
This seems to contradict the fact that not one meaningful piece of
legislation came out of

the

primarily to partisanship;

last Congress.

for the

Democrat is in the White House.

first

time

This may

be due

in 12 years,

a

This could signal a new era of
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cooperation between the legislative and executive branches that was
notoriously absent during the latter part of the decade.
Aside from these general conolusions, though, not much can be
said, due to the restrictions of the model and the data.

While the

research here supports the hypothesis that industrial policy as
construed by the Clinton administration is better than no policy,
this can only extend to those specific policies covered within the
scope of this paper.

There are other aspects of an industrial

policy, such as NTB and tariff policy, which were not analyzed, but
in a full-blown analysis, would be by necessity evaluated as part
of the entire policy.
Also, the other proposals that Clinton has proposed under the
guise of industrial policy may not have the same rate of acceptance
(8 out of 9) that these particular policies did.

One cannot infer

anything about the success of the former from the latter, other
than it is likely that similar proposals addressing different
topics may be more likely to pass.

There is very little that can

be inferred from this data, short of the general feasibility of
industrial policy in the United states.

Problems and Limitations
There are several problems in this presentation that can be
ironed out with further research.

They can be divided into two

sets, problems with the model and problems with the data.

Through

more refined research and theoretical development, these problems
can be overcome in future endeavors so that a more solid and
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comprehensive analysis of industrial policies can occur.
The first set of problems and limitations concerns the model.
First, it is in essence a subjective ranking based on opinion about
any economic and political theory the author holds true.

It

therefore loses any and all comparability with another person's
ranking criterion.
criterion

into

objectively

formulaic

analyze

consequences
limitation

A more sophisticated model that takes objective

of

consideration

what

certain

significantly

are

the

needed

economic

proposals.
hampers

is

this

While

to

and
this

research,

try

and

political
particular
this

model

nevertheless is worthwhile, because it opens the door to a new mode
of thinking about how Congress mayor should approach decision
making about the economy.

This model serves as a first step in the

right direction, not as the finished product.
Another limitation of the model, as discussed before, is that
it cannot tell the magnitude of a particular policy's feasibility.
The more feasible of two policies, for instance, may not be in
reali ty feasible at all.

The model presented here cannot take this

into account, so the conclusions that can be drawn from it are
limited.

Further development of the model is necessary to deduce

a more sophisticated approach that can represent the magnitude of
the distance between the individual policy prescriptions.
Despite these problems and limitations, this model serves its
purpose well.

As stated earlier, it is a first step in researching

industrial policy implications in the future.

Also, it can provide

a good comparison of two proposals, especially pitting one proposal
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against doing nothing,
done.

the null proposal,

as this research has

This gives a general idea of whether an undertaking such as

industrial policy is worth undertaking, or whether it is better to
do nothing.
The model is not the sole source of problems and limitations
for

this

type

limitations
endeavor.

of

that

research,
can

though.

dampen

any

The

data

conclusions

also

drawn

has

some

from

this

First, only a few selected proposals and/or campaign

promises that President Clinton has made have been studied here.
Therefore there may not be a comprehensive look at what his overall
industrial
policies,

policy may
it is

look

like.

Without all

the

individual

impossible to evaluate the overall

industrial

policy Clinton has proposed; this research can only pass judgment
on certain aspects of the proposed policy.
Second, to trUly feel how this policy would stand up, other
industrial policies should be analyzed in the same way, and,put
against the Clinton plan.

It would even suffice to take individual

components from several people's ideas and evaluate them and this
plan at the same time.
difficult,

This gives more alternatives, and is more

but the results

indicate better what direction the

policy should lie in.
The data would be much more concrete if actual costs and
benefits could be estimated about the programs.

This would enable

the model to be more objective as well, as it would partially be
based some objective facts and figures.

Data such as this also

provides the researcher with an implicit measure of magnitude in
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the difference between net benefit levels between the proposals.
However, data of this type is very expensive to collect, and simply
could not be obtained for this project.
Problems such as these can be corrected in future research
undertaken in this vein.

For now, however, the research must draw

its conclusions based on the data and the model's results.

This

data must be analyzed for its implications and evaluations of the
policy prescriptions.
emanate from this data.

Obviously a new policy prescription will
This research shows, that in spite of the

problems associated with the model

and the data,

the

policy

proposals of Bill Clinton are more or less economically sound and
politically viable, and that an inclusive industrial policy can
help American productivity and therefore its competitiveness.
Despite the limitations of both the data and the model, the
research indicates

that the

industrial

policy of the Clinton

acbninistration, when compared to government inaction, is worthwhile
and both economically and more importantly politically feasible.
The only aspect of the nine policies proposed that failed here was
the infrastructure policy.

This is not to say it won't pass, but

it is far more likely for Congress to do nothing on infrastructure
than to adopt this proposal.

More comprehensive research needs to

be done in this area, but general indications are that America can
indeed benefit from an industrial policy like the one considered
here.
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